Given
recent events it is fitting that we spend some time on energy, an area in which
we have had an interest for many years. The current conflict in the Middle East
has created the greatest shock to the world’s energy supply in history, the
International Energy Agency reports. Much to the surprise of many, it has also
impacted access to other important but little-noticed commodities, such as
helium and sulphur, which threatens industries from agriculture to computer
chips. Costs have spiked, interest rates are higher, chaos reigns in the
financial markets, and the lives of many people have been thrown into disarray.
The longer the disruptions last, the greater the challenges for finance and
economic activity will become.
There
is one area touching on energy supply that has received scant attention, but
has long-term implications, especially for the U.S. The table below showing the
ten countries with the largest hydrocarbon reserves illustrates the
slowly-approaching watershed moment:
|
Rank |
Country |
Proved
Reserves (billion boe) |
2024
Production (mboe/d) |
Reserve Live (years) |
Production
Cost (USD/boe) |
|
1 |
Venezuela |
348.0 |
0.9 |
~1060 |
10-40 |
|
2 |
Saudi Arabia |
322.4 |
12.8 |
~69 |
2-10 |
|
3 |
Iran |
218.6 |
5.1 |
~118 |
5-15 |
|
4 |
Canada |
191.0 |
4.3 |
~121 |
20-50 |
|
5 |
Russia |
168.1 |
15.8 |
~29 |
8-20 |
|
6 |
Unite Arab Emirates |
161.6 |
4.6 |
~96 |
3-10 |
|
7 |
Iraq |
153.0 |
4.3 |
~98 |
5-12 |
|
8 |
Kuwait |
101.5 |
2.7 |
~103 |
3-8 |
|
9 |
USA |
105.3 |
17.5 |
~16 |
15-45 |
|
10 |
Qatar |
98.5 |
1.9 |
~142 |
0.5-5 |
Notes on the
table:
1. “Boe” refers to “barrel of oil
equivalent.” This is a standard industry measure that translates oil and gas
reserves into an energy-equivalent basis, permitting comparisons of reserves
between countries possessing differing amounts of each commodity. The figures
in the table are dynamic, meaning they change with commodity prices and new
discoveries.
2. Venezuela’s oil industry has been
depressed (due to mismanagement and sanctions); should its production return to
something more normal, its reserve life would be far less than 1000 years, and
probably more like Saudi Arabia’s or Iran’s. Since its oil is very heavy, and
difficult and expensive to produce, it will take some time to return to
historical levels.
3. The production figures are for 2024.
Current U.S. production is about 22 million barrels a day, and reserve life in
the 10-12-year range.
The U.S. stands
out in this list. It sits near the bottom in terms of reserves,
yet owing to the “fracking revolution” and incentives, its production
outstrips all others. However, its reserve life is the lowest, and its costs
are among the highest (fracking is expensive). Such figures belie the
often-heard claim that the U.S. is an “energy powerhouse” outproducing all
other oil-producing countries, and able to go it alone, weathering supply
shocks with abundant energy at lower prices than industrial nation competitors.
This may, in fact, be true, but only in the relatively short term. Limited
reserve life foreshadows a day of reckoning, but that is not the only factor.
So far, the nation’s frackers have been targeting the easiest-to-access shale
reserves, acreage that is depleting. As it does, already high production costs
will have to rise even more just to sustain high output, and commodity prices
will have to be correspondingly higher for the business to be profitable. The
industry’s experience last Fall illustrates the dilemma: production waned
slightly in response to prices declining to about $60 per barrel, not enough to
warrant making the investments needed to drill wells and increase the flow of
gas and oil.
It is certainly
possible that large pools of petroleum are waiting to be discovered, but it
seems highly unlikely they are lurking somewhere within the U.S. or areas under
its control, so new reserves won’t save us. Furthermore, the country’s refusal
to use a period of hydrocarbon abundance to invest in new energy sources for
the future will only exacerbate the international disadvantages that the
approaching end of America’s hydrocarbon prowess will likely usher in. As the
late Charles Munger of Berkshire Hathaway once said:
I like having big reserves of oil. If I
were running the benevolent despot of the United States, I would just leave
most of the oil we have here, and I’d pay whatever the Arabs charge for their
oil and I’d pay it cheerfully and conserve my own. I think it’s going to be
very precious stuff over the next 200 years.
Such a long-term
view is never very popular, not to mention politically acceptable, but it is
one we all should be seriously thinking about. The figures in the table will
change with the vicissitudes of supply, demand, and the various non-economic
influences on energy markets. Nevertheless, as long as the policy of maximizing
production holds, and regardless of the outcome of the current hostilities, the
direction of travel seems clear.
*
* *
While not exactly
a “black swan” event—given that the potential for economic stress stemming from
a broad Middle East war has been discussed for years—the fallout from the
increasingly widespread conflict with Iran has negatively impacted a largely
unprepared world, but the U.S. only modestly so far. Transportation fuel cost
increases are the one single item that has been felt broadly, with gasoline up
about $1 per gallon, and the aftereffect of an even greater rise in diesel will
soon be seen on supermarket shelves and in the prices of any items relying on
truck deliveries. Still, consumers have shown few signs of diminished
enthusiasm for shopping, and the blow to business so far is far less than in
prior energy shocks, such as in the 1970s, when energy use was far less
efficient than it is today.
Unsurprisingly, the
financial markets have reacted with their usual drama, with volatility spiking
and averages leaping or dropping, depending on the contents of the latest
social media posts. Declining markets tend to elicit a lot of commentary from
market analysts and pundits who like to talk about “corrections,” “v-shaped
recoveries” and such. But before we permit Paul Krugman’s “Very Serious People”
to dominate the discourse, let’s put the market response in perspective.
Interest rates are rising as bond prices fall. The U.S 10-year treasury bond
yield is up about 0.5% from February 27 (the day before the hostilities began),
which is significant because it feeds into consumer rates on products such as
mortgages. Still, rates remain below long-term averages. Stocks are down about
7% as we write, but that lies well within the normal fluctuation range. There
is evidence of individual stock enthusiasts continuing to use market declines
to heavily “buy the dips.” Not exactly a “nothing to see here” situation, but
far from being a serious rout.
What happens
after the fighting stops is now the subject of much speculation. The tone of
these comments is telling. For example, one of the big banks encouraged
investors to “keep on climbing that wall of worry,” meaning, buy in spite of
negative news because fundamentals will out in the end. Normally this would be
reasonable advice, but one wonders how long this bank would maintain this
stance it if stocks tumbled far more than 7%. Such is the depth of bullishness
in the financial world—brought on by a long period of relative stability
beginning in the early 1980s—that not even a shooting war involving, directly
or indirectly, a host of real and potential adversaries from around the world
can shake it.
We don’t like
market doomsayers any more than optimists; the latter tend to have a problem
with valuation (buying high), while the former never seem to know when their
negativism is “priced-in” to valuations already (for example, before the
beginning of the great bull market in 1982, doomsters expected further declines).
We prefer realism based on analysis, and hopefully free of the bias brought on
by the long-term stability we have all experienced for over 40 years. We are
aware of market risks but are ready to jump at opportunities which analysis
reveals, focusing on the long term. The approaching sea change outlined in the
first part of this letter, for example, could have profound consequences. It is
best to prepare for such an occurrence during calmer times, because trying to
“re-position” portfolios in the midst of a “black swan” event is far too late.
Sooner or later we may be buying “from the Arabs,”
whether we like it or not.